Jon Wetlesen:

Biocentric Moral Status.

The moral status of beings who are not persons.

A cauistic argument

Utgitt 2005. 94 sider

This book addresses the question: Who or what can have a moral status in the sense that we have direct moral duties to them?

It argues for a biocentric answer which ascribes inherent moral status value to all individual living organisms. This position must be defended against an anthropocentric position.

The argumetn from margianl cases propounded by Tom Regan and Peter Singer for this purpose is criticised as defective, and a different argument is proposed.

The biocentric position developed here is related to that of Albert Schweitzer and Paul F Taylor, but rejects their assumption of equal inherent value for all living organisms. I argues instead for equeal moral status for moral persons and agents, and gradual moral value for non-persons, depending on their degree of similarity with moral persons. Mary Ann Warren's book on Moral Status is also discussed.

The argument presented in this book is constructed as a casuistic argument, proceeding by analogical extension from person to non-persons. The meta-ethical question of its pragmatic validity is discussed

Keywords:

Moral status, inherent value, causuistic argument, strong versus weak cognitivism, pragmatic validity.